

Taking the Initiative:
Somaliland's Regional Opportunities for International Recognition

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I. Executive Summary and Recommendations

Although Somaliland's moral and legal validity for statehood recognition is strong and substantiated, pursuing recognition through reference to moral and legal arguments has proved thus far unsuccessful. Most governments still largely ignore this de facto state's success and the broader international public is not even aware of its existence. This report outlines innovative ways to create awareness and garner support in the international community as well as methods to pressure decision makers with the goal to further Somaliland's bid for international recognition. Our new ideas will build on current efforts to engage with the African Union. Through the exploration of Somaliland's relations with Somalia, its neighbors, other key states and regional organizations, we came to understand that raising its profile would be Somaliland's most successful path into the community of nations. A long-term plan not only advances Somaliland's quest for recognition but also improves its regional standing and positions it as an important partner for the future. Our research indicates that Somaliland can advance its pursuit of international recognition in a three-pronged approach.

Primarily, **Somaliland should present itself as an active partner for cooperation.** We propose three areas of regional cooperation that are opportunities for Somaliland to act as a state by taking on responsibility, showing initiative and addressing some of the region's pressing issues: the **environment, health and refugees.**

Environment Initiative

Somaliland is one of only two entirely arid regions in Africa and home to both endemic and endangered plant and animal species. As such, a Somaliland environment initiative would commit to stewardship of this unique environment while raising awareness to the cause of international recognition by engaging with an active and vocal global environmental lobby. Protecting Somaliland's rich biodiversity from destruction is a goal in its own. In addition, biosphere reserves aim to enhance people's livelihoods and guideline environmental sustainability. At the same time, being a part of the Biosphere Reserve network raises the awareness of environmental and development issues and would be incentive for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to fund projects. Our proposed environment initiative consists of nominating biodiverse and environmentally rich areas within Somaliland to UNESCO's Biosphere Reserve Network. Since only states can commit to international treaties, participation in an environmental protection and sustainability framework can provide Somaliland with a new and significant argument for recognition.

Health Initiative

Health is a critically important issue that Somaliland and other countries in the Horn of Africa share. Precedents recognize the importance of cooperative health networks but do not take that notion far enough. The World Health Organization (WHO) has various maternal/child health and child vaccination programs in the area but they are often limited to countrywide practices. A Somaliland-led health initiative in the Horn would address the region-wide issues such as drought, famine, loss of livestock, and limited child vaccination, with an effort to consolidate knowledge on health issues and form a network of medical officers and hospitals. While Somaliland has limited funds to

establish such a network, the health initiative is a way to venture beyond short-term political goals toward a shared future with Djibouti, Ethiopia and Somalia made possible only via cooperation. A health initiative would demonstrate to neighbors and the international community that Somaliland is committed to its responsibilities as a state.

Refugee Initiative

The refugee initiative is a significant and proactive move. The large number of Somali refugees in neighboring countries places strain on these host countries. A Somaliland offer to take its own people back and help out with the refugees from the south may convince host countries, like Yemen and Djibouti, to support Somaliland's claim for recognition, if only for the sake of mutual benefits. Somaliland is already the reluctant receiver of many returnees and "Internally Displaced Persons". Becoming an active participant in repatriation programs and refugee protection – with massive international aid and assistance, of course – is a way of acting like a state in order to become one. The fact that refugee programs are more feasible for independent states is an argument for expedited recognition.

Somaliland – Somalia Relations

Recognition of Somaliland has advantages for Somalia, which should be pointed out to more sympathetic individuals and groups in the south. In particular, an internationally recognized Somaliland can be more active in the peace process and more willing to conduct joint development efforts. Reconciliation efforts will ease tensions. Most importantly, immediate multi-party negotiations should address the conflict with Puntland over Somaliland's eastern regions of Sool and Sanaag.

Somaliland should seek membership and involvement in as many organizations as possible. The government must be persistently and proactively follow up on the application to the African Union. We recommend that Somaliland seek entry into the British Commonwealth and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Instead of the current "all-or-nothing" approach, we suggest that Somaliland accepts "less-than-state" options, for example observer status as an intermediary step. Thus, the country can participate in the organizations' work and raise its profile. Involved parties will appreciate a less confrontational stance and compromise on a gradual way to recognition.

Lastly, **Somaliland must pursue individually tailored approaches for possible supporters.** In relations with particular neighbors, drawing parallels to the case studies included in this report will be advantageous. Diplomatic talks with Algeria would include the case of Western Sahara, while the case of Kosovo would be a significant precedent for European governments. When speaking to the United States, in light of the U.S. National Security Strategy, the strongest argument for Somaliland is its homegrown democracy.

We agree that diplomatic efforts should focus on its neighbor and closest ally Ethiopia. The port of Berbera holds strategic importance for Ethiopia, and Somaliland should try to invest in its development. Of all Arab states, Yemen and Algeria seem most sympathetic to Somaliland and Somaliland should pursue them persistently.

II. Issues

A. SOMALILAND AND SOMALIA

The Somaliland government downplays the importance of a good relationship with Somalia. Somaliland sees itself as completely independent from the south and worries that outsiders could interpret any attention paid to the situation as willingness to compromise on the issue of independence. Nevertheless, the fact is that Somaliland and Somalia have a shared history and many cultural commonalities and clan ties. In order to make a case for international recognition of Somaliland, an analysis of the relationship of the two countries is advisable.

i. Colonial Background and Homegrown Democracy

Somalia and Somaliland's different colonial backgrounds have resulted in very different political and social structures. Despite efforts during the 1960s to harmonize the separate administrative, legal and education systems, they remained disparate. In the 15 years since Somaliland declared independence from Somalia, Somalia has remained without government institutions or centralized power, causing the political culture to grow even further apart.¹ Still today, Somalia's power-sharing arrangements between competing warlords are interim or transitional while Somaliland has held parliamentary and presidential elections and has built real functioning institutions. Additionally, the country has undertaken impressive efforts to disarm and demobilize its militias. Even the armed liberation movement disbanded after the fighting ended. One important aspect of the north's political culture, setting it apart from the south and from many other African states, is the fact that rotation of leadership is paramount. The Somali National Movement (SNM), Somaliland's liberation fighters, had eight or nine leaders in ten years.²

These efforts undertaken are homegrown and have the support of the broad public.³ That democracy is homegrown rather than a strategy to gain something becomes clear in the Somaliland's unique system that integrates traditional mediation in the form of the Council of Elders - the *Guurti* - into its modern state system.

The locally based democratic understanding will keep the country from abandoning democracy even if it is not recognized. This, however, should not be the reason to withhold recognition from Somaliland. In fact, doing so is hypocritical in light of recent emphasis on democratization. In a time when democratization has been elevated to policy in the United States, politicians who push such democratization policy should laud, and not ignore, a country that democratizes independently from within itself, that is dealing democratically with political crises and that commits itself to democracy and human rights.

¹ Hussein Adam. Phone interview, 10 March 2006. For information on experts quoted in the report, please consult Appendix C.

² Ibid.

³ The 2001 Referendum on Somaliland's new constitutions resulted in 97% approval. International Crisis Group. "Somaliland: Democratization and its Discontents"

Furthermore, not to accept the fact that right now two countries exist that have not shared any political structures and that have developed in very different directions, or at least at very different speeds, is dangerous - there is still a slight chance that the unrealistic insistence on Somalia's territorial integrity could eventually reopen the civil war.

The often-repeated argument that the Somali people are ethnically homogeneous and should therefore live in a unified country is flawed in more than one regard. First, it limits self-determination to ethnically different groups. Are only ethnic movements genuinely nationalistic? Should we not support nationalism based on common political ideals? Second, Somalis have always lived in different countries, and the dream of a Greater Somalia, uniting the Somali regions of Somalia, Somaliland, Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia, was short-lived. Ethnic nationalism brought Somalia and Somaliland together in 1960 but the pursuit of a Greater Somalia proved an illusion. Of course, the other unifying forces of language, culture, ethnicity and religion were still there, but in the following decades, experiences of oppression and civil war trumped them. Somaliland's independence would not threaten economic or even identity ties between clans and sub-clans: such ties already exist across borders, between Somalis in any of the five regions and in the diaspora. Most Somalilanders have more frequent contact with clan relatives or business partners in Djibouti or East Ethiopia than with people in southern Somalia.

In discussions with U.S. representatives (in particular lawmakers who have spoken out in favor of democratization) and Britain, an important argument can be that by recognizing Somaliland they would send a strong signal that democratic transition is appreciated and will be rewarded. Not to recognize, on the other hand, sends the message that the "will of the people" is negligible and that democracy is important and rewarded only in selected cases.

Distinguished academic Ali Mazrui suggests that Somaliland should also take advantage of its status as a former British colony by applying for Commonwealth membership.⁴ This step can be part of a strategy to become active in as many organizations as possible. Commonwealth status can be an intermediate step on the way to full international recognition. Within this effort, there are several levels: semi-official ones, for example the application of Somaliland's universities to become Commonwealth universities, and official ones, e.g. full inter-governmental collaboration on Commonwealth-level.

ii. Historical Grievances

According to Ahmed Egal, during the 31 years of union the only infrastructure or industry constructed in the north was one road connecting Mogadishu and Burao and one cement factory that had to be built close to the raw material.⁵ Additionally, Siad Barre's economic policies curbed the influence of the wealthy Isaaq trading community dwelling in Somaliland. As a reaction to the 1981 uprising, the oppression worsened: Africa Watch documented summary killings, arbitrary arrest, detention in squalid conditions, torture,

⁴ Ali Mazrui. Phone interview, 6 April 2006.

⁵ Ahmed Egal. Email interview, 13 March 2006.

rape, crippling restraints on freedom of movement and psychological intimidation.⁶ The all-out civil war that began in 1988 devastated the north and left deep bitterness.

The situation bears similarities to Kosovo, something to emphasize when talking to prospective European supporters of Somaliland. Charles Kupchan of Georgetown University wrote the following in *Foreign Affairs* in November/December 2005, which, slightly adjusted, could speak of the Somaliland case:

Given the atrocities they have suffered in the past and the autonomy they are enjoying now, Kosovo's Albanians will never accept continued Serbian sovereignty. The time has come to give them what they want -- independence. Nevertheless, harsh realities on the ground make independence for Kosovo the only viable option. Kosovo has already left Serbia's orbit. Pretending otherwise and denying or delaying independence risks a return to disorder and bloodshed - and is therefore the greater of two evils.

The official position of leaders discussing Kosovo is that Kosovo's historical grievances should not set a precedent for state-creation. Nevertheless, the facts speak for themselves: Kosovo's population is approx. 2 million. The Kosovo war of 1998-2000 killed more than 20,000 civilians and produced 1.3 million refugees.⁷ Somaliland, with its current population of 2 million - 3 million, suffered 50,000 - 60,000 dead and almost 1 million people displaced. If backers of Kosovo independence invoke the argument that historical grievances make coexistence in the same state impossible, this is surely valid in Somaliland's case as well, at least as "supporting evidence".

iii. Somalia's Consent

The Economist reported in 1999 "[t]he main reason why the world will not accept Somaliland's independence is that the rest of Somalia does not want it." While no statistics or opinion polls are available, the perception that all of southern Somalia fervently opposes Somaliland independence is wrong. Not all Somalis in the south feel passionate about keeping Somaliland in its fold. Somali Prime Minister Geedi told the BBC, "If the international community recognizes Somaliland then we will have nothing against that."⁸ According to Ahmed Esa, other politicians in the south have expressed support for Somaliland as well.⁹ In a phone interview, Hussein Adam said that Somalia's central and southern regions and the clans therein do not care much about what is going on in the north.¹⁰ Mainly those with ties to the north oppose partition; they, however, are deeply involved emotionally as well as politically, and Somaliland cannot ignore their opposition.

⁶ *Africa Watch*. "Somalia: A Government at War With Its Own People", January 1990.

⁷ Independent International Commission on Kosovo. "The Kosovo Report," 23 October 2000.

⁸ <http://www.awdalnews.com/wmview.php?ArtID=6871>. A few days later, after he was criticized by pro-unity groups, Geedi qualified his statement and called Somaliland "a Somali entity first of all", but even while denying that Somaliland was a separate state he left the door open for a future dialogue on the "destiny of the Somali people."

⁹ Ahmed Esa. Email interview, 12 March 2006.

¹⁰ Hussein Adam. Phone interview, 10 March 2006.

If Somaliland could secure the south's approval, the advantages are obvious. Precedents show that the international community readily accepts new countries into its fold if secession or partition happened in a mutual understanding, for example: the Czech Republic and Slovakia, or Ethiopia and Eritrea. Somalia consent to Somaliland's independence would strengthen the latter's position vis-à-vis the African Union.

Looking at the situation on the ground, though, raises an important question: who in Somalia would have the authority to recognize another country? Parts of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) have signaled they are not opposed to an independent Somaliland, while other parts strongly condemn it. Who has the decisive voice?

Somaliland officials insist that Somalia has no say in Somaliland's independent decision to be its own country again. The Somaliland Foreign Minister stated, "The government sees no reason why it should talk to warlords who never showed interest in peace or dialogue."¹¹ That the current TFG parliament includes many of the same people who were architects of the civil war is another reason for Somalilanders not to talk to representatives of the south. Somaliland law bars discussion of reunification with the south.¹² We have not seen the wording of the law. Probably Somaliland sees this limitation of freedom of expression as a necessity as long as the new relations on a state-to-state basis between Somalia and Somaliland have not been formalized. If the law is as strict as indicated, the Somaliland government should be advised that infringement of freedom of expression could turn off possible supporters.

A southern veto is unacceptable for the north. A vivid warning is the 1961 referendum on the joint constitution, which north and south held jointly. Because the south had so many more people, the northern protest vote had no bearing on the outcome. The fear that Somalia, once reemerged and strengthened, may insist on keeping Somaliland in the union, could even motivate Somaliland to try to block the peace process, because chances for international recognition could actually improve with continuing chaos in the south: if the international community gives up on Somalia it may lose interest in defending its unity. In order to avoid this dangerous scenario, one should see Somaliland as a partner for the peace efforts, not alienate it into being a spoiler.

While we agree that Somaliland does not need Somalia's approval, in order to minimize any negative effects of international recognition Somaliland should work harder on pulling parts of Somali society over to its side. It could start more (confidential) contacts with southerners who support, or not oppose, partition (this goes as high as the current Prime Minister). Also, Somaliland should offer help in Somalia's peace process. Furthermore, the north should make sure that refugees from the south are treated well, are not discriminated against and are safe.

¹¹ Edna Adan Ismail. Interview with Radio TamTam 2005.

¹² Ahmed Esa. Email interview, 12 March 2006.

iv. Territorial Dispute with Puntland

A major issue that will influence any Somalia-Somaliland discussions is Somaliland's claims to parts of Sool and eastern Sanaag, regions that neighboring Puntland claims. While overall support of the Somaliland population for independence and international recognition is impressive, people's loyalties in the contested region are divided: an estimated 50% of Sanaag residents and an even higher proportion in Sool have sympathies with Puntland. The connection to Puntland is clan-based, while culturally, politically and economically the regions are closer to Somaliland.¹³

Still, the close friendship between Somaliland and the Sool/Sanaag regions may be subordinate to clan loyalty in a society where family and clan ties are the most important identification. Certain clan elders who wield immense influence must be drawn into Somaliland's fold. For example, the Dulbahante elder Garaad Abdiqani used to be close to Hargeisa, but he became disaffected and abandoned the Somaliland cause. He even moved the Dulbahante toward Puntland where his clan received the post of Vice President.¹⁴

President Egal tried hard to integrate pro-Somaliland politicians from the contested regions into the government by assigning them cabinet posts. Lately, however, Somaliland's interest in the Sool constituency seems to have waned. For example, in the 2003 presidential elections much of Sool and Sanaag could not vote for "security reasons", leaving them out of the political process. That might prove to be a mistake; people in the regions might feel sidelined and neglected.

In some respects, the current Sool and Sanaag situation brings to mind Somalia-Somaliland relations during the union: a smaller, disaffected region feeling neglected and seeing not much gain in supporting the union. We are not in a position to say whether Sool's desire to belong to Puntland rather than Somaliland is as strong as Somaliland's desire to dissolve its union with Somalia. The 2003 International Crisis Group (ICG) report states that the Harti leadership is "ambivalent."

To conduct a nationwide referendum on the question cannot be a solution. The regions' residents in large numbers boycotted the 2001 referendum, or voted no – but in the larger picture their vote had no impact.

Somaliland with its historical experience should show special respect for the will of the local population and its right to self-determination. It should also acknowledge that the situation on the ground may have changed since the colonial borders have been drawn; maybe in Somaliland's favor (strong political ties), maybe to its disadvantage (loyalty to the clan). The Kulmiye party has strong support in the east and would certainly benefit from Sool's engagement in Somaliland politics. Ahmed Esa, a party leader, is adamant that Sool and eastern Sanaag stay within Somaliland's borders.¹⁵ However, he admits that mistakes have been made in managing the regions, which alienated them from the

¹³ Hussein Adam. Phone interview, 10 March 2006.

¹⁴ International Crisis Group. "Somaliland: Democratisation and its Discontents", 28 July 2003.

¹⁵ Ahmed Esa. Email interview, 12 March 2006.

democratization process. He claims the rectification of this mismanagement has already begun, but does not detail how.

The danger that Somaliland could resort to violence lies in the current uncertainty. The country feels left to its own devices when its borders and with them its independence are threatened. Therefore, Somaliland might overreact to perceived threats. An example: When a small Australian mining company signed an exploration contract with Puntland, giving them the right to mine in Sool and Sanaag, the Somaliland government reacted sharply and proclaimed it would defend its territory. Escalation is possible, but so far, Somaliland has shown restraint.

Some experts say that Somaliland's recognition should come now while Somalia is too preoccupied to react violently. Others see a slight possibility that the TFG, which is still trying to enhance its legitimacy, could be tempted to exploit recognition by declaring war or trying to intervene with militias from Puntland. It is debatable whether Somalia's President Yusuf would have enough support in the south to start a fight for Sool. This probability may increase with a united and strengthened south. President Yusuf's rallying of Sool and Sanaag to broaden his power base and further his presidential aspirations in the run-up to the Kenya peace conference could indicate political opportunism rather than holding on to Sool at any cost. In that case, negotiations may be possible. Of course, this is speculation, but so is the claim that Somalia would start a war with Somaliland since, more than anything, most Somalis want peace. Immediate efforts of reconciliation and cooperation on as many levels as possible would diminish risk of a later conflict.

Somaliland should show a clear commitment to address the misgivings of the eastern regions. The efforts of Ahmed Esa and other politicians can be a first step. A pressing problem is the delivery of humanitarian aid to the remote regions that has been hindered by the tensions, in one case even leading to a suspension of aid delivery.¹⁶ The current drought has hit Sool and Sanaag hard, and access to aid is vital. If Somaliland can guarantee the distribution of aid, it will certainly score points with the population. For immediate organization as well as future cooperation it will be important to include the elders and local leaders.

In the long run, this might not be enough. Somaliland should set a timeline for a referendum in the eastern regions, perhaps in five years. That gives Somaliland time to convince Sool and Sanaag of the benefits of staying with Somaliland. Alternatives to the status quo or a union with Puntland could include a special autonomous status within a federal Somaliland. Parties to the discussion should include Somaliland, the affected regions Sool, Sanaag, and Mogadishu (Puntland never wanted to secede from Somalia). Currently, Somalia has no solidified government. Furthermore, the TFG interim president is a former Puntland warlord who used eastern Somaliland clans to broaden his power base and further his ambition to become Somalia's president. In this situation, an independent party, maybe the African Union (AU) or Ethiopia, should oversee negotiations between Somaliland and Puntland.

¹⁶ "Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia", 21 February 2006, S/2006/122.

v. Advantages for Somalia

Somaliland is at this time not involved in the peace process in the south because the country is aware of the possibility that such engagement could pull it back into the conflict.¹⁷ It is also concerned that cooperation would signal to the wider world that Somaliland sees itself as part of Somalia. Once Somaliland is internationally recognized and its fears abated, it will be able to take a more active role in the reconciliation process in the south. Due to the close kinship and shared experiences, Somaliland's contribution could be very valuable. Somaliland in fact has offered to host a conference for Somalia peace talks. At the same time, Somaliland's recognition would be a wake-up call for Somalia.¹⁸ It would demonstrate that reconciliation and power sharing bring tangible benefits like aid and capital inflows as well as a seat at the table of international organizations.

Already Somaliland has shown its willingness to cooperate. Despite diplomatic considerations against it, the Somaliland government has decided to participate actively in the United Nations joint needs assessment that will benefit both Somalia and Somaliland. A joint needs assessment brings experts from UN, World Bank and the diaspora together to find solutions for pressing problems from governance to infrastructure, macroeconomics to reconciliation. Because the program takes place in the UN framework, Somaliland is defined as a region of Somalia. Nevertheless, Somaliland has decided that participating in the program is more beneficial – for itself and Somalia – than abstaining. If again this concession does not result in acknowledgement that Somaliland is an independent, viable state, Somaliland may revise this policy of collaboration.

B. SOMALILAND AND OTHER COUNTRIES

i. Ethiopia

Somaliland shares a border with Ethiopia, Djibouti and Somalia; of these neighbors, Ethiopia is Somaliland's important ally. Four main factors strengthen Ethiopia's and Somaliland's current relationship. First, Ethiopian support and recognition of Somaliland would result in a new, peaceful and stable neighbor. Furthermore, Ethiopia will gain a lot through Somaliland's international recognition, as it will gain a stable and peaceful neighbor "with whom they could establish the normal state-to-state relations," according to Ahmed Egal.¹⁹ With Somaliland as an internationally recognized state, Ethiopia will "gain an invaluable ally in seeking a resolution of the problem that is the collapsed state in Somalia."

Second, Ethiopia's concern regarding the Greater Somalia movement will subside with the recognition of Somaliland as a state separate from Somalia. The historical and strained relationship between Ethiopia and Somalia over the Ogaden region will be eased by supporting Somaliland, which has no intention of making territorial claims from any of its neighbors. While a pan-Somali/united Somalia movement is dead for all practical

¹⁷ Ahmed Esa. Email interview, 12 March 2006.

¹⁸ I.M. Lewis. "Building the Somaliland Republic", 8 January 2005.

¹⁹ Ahmed Egal. Email interview, 13 March 2006.

purposes,²⁰ some groups in southern Somalia still believe in the cause. Although the issue of Sool and Sanaag as regions disputed with Puntland remains, it does not indicate that Somaliland's foreign policies strive to go beyond their borders.

Third, Ethiopia recognition of Somaliland greatly affects its economic capability. Ethiopia's main interest in continuing friendly ties with and supporting Somaliland is over the use of port of Berbera. Landlocked Ethiopia does not wish to be restricted to only using the port of Djibouti (a deepwater port) as it currently does. In addition, road and rail links to the port of Sudan and Mombasa are either non-existent or very poorly constructed and maintained. Ethiopia benefits from Somaliland's ports in humanitarian crises too, for example, in 2000 a United States Agency for International Development (USAID) delegation traveled to Berbera "to assess the facilities and explore the possibility of using the port to bring relief supplies to famine victims in Ethiopia."²¹ Somaliland is correct in placing high importance to developing its deepwater port at Berbera; Somaliland can use access to sea as a prime negotiating feature with Ethiopia.

Fourth, if Somaliland is internationally recognized, Somali refugees (from Siad Barre's civil war) currently in Ethiopia can be repatriated to Somaliland.²²

Ethiopia currently maintains regular flights from Addis Ababa to Hargeisa and the Ethiopia-Somaliland border is relatively free and open for travel and economic purposes. Economic trade revolves around the Ethiopian exports of qat to Somaliland, "representing a major outflow (possibly the biggest single outflow) of foreign currency out of Somaliland."²³ It is critical for Somaliland to use historic and economic ties with Ethiopia to garner support for international recognition. Although Ethiopia was the first country in Africa to consent to secession (of Eritrea), it is reticent to make the first step in the African Union (AU) to recognize Somaliland. Somaliland is trying to get Ethiopia and South Africa on their side and to take the first step to recognition within the AU by encouraging visits to Somaliland, and through dialogue between corresponding ministers.²⁴ Ethiopian Foreign Minister Ato Mesfin Seyoum has stated that Ethiopia will not be at the forefront on the Somaliland issue since they are "burdened by all the history between Somalis and Ethiopia." However, days later, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi while in South Africa publicly stated, "Ethiopia is in favor of Somaliland independence and will work behind the scenes to secure it."²⁵

ii. Djibouti

Opposing forces determine Djibouti's relationship with Somaliland. On the one hand, Djibouti is Somaliland's banker since Somaliland does not have a national bank and state currency. In addition, Djibouti and Somaliland share an internal protocol to leave their borders open for trade and economic activity. Wealthy Somali diaspora in Djibouti (the

²⁰ Hussein Adam. Phone interview, 10 March 2006.

²¹ Global Policy Forum "Will America Support the Partition of Somalia?", 24 August 2000 <http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/somalia5.htm>

²² For more information on the issue of refugees, please refer to the Refugee Initiative in section III.D.

²³ Global Policy Forum, 24 August 2000.

²⁴ Hussein Adam. Phone interview, 10 March 2006.

²⁵ Ahmed Esa. Email interview, 12 March 2006.

Isaaq clan) have recently begun to invest in Somaliland and so their voice and opinion is crucial.²⁶ On the other hand, Djibouti is more interested in brokering a peace agreement in Somalia than recognizing Somaliland as a state. In August 2000, Djibouti, along with Egypt, was the host country that helped form Somalia's Transitional National Government (TNG). Egypt's motivations²⁷ against Somaliland recognition stem from a belief in a united Somalia, which would effectively act as a counterweight to Ethiopia.

Although Djibouti benefits from its status as Somaliland's banker, a developing and modern port in Berbera could hamper Djibouti's monopoly in its port services to land-locked Ethiopia. Even though Egypt heavily influences Djibouti and it is in competition with Somaliland for provision of port services to Ethiopia, it would behoove Somaliland to continue to build their relationship with Djibouti. The strongest connection between Djibouti and Somaliland are the vocal and financially influential Somali diaspora in both areas. Drawing lessons from the East Timorese²⁸ struggle for independence and recognition, Somaliland should not underestimate the power and ability of their worldwide diaspora.

iii. Kenya

Kenya does not share a border with Somaliland, but is an important regional political player and could be crucial to international recognition. Kenyan Somali and Kenyans in general are culturally closer to Somalis than to Somalilanders. This explains why Kenya has a greater stake in bringing peace and stability to Somalia than recognizing Somaliland.²⁹ In 2004, Kenya, with Ethiopian support, hosted the UN-sponsored initiative to form the TFG, the latest coalition government led by President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed and Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Geedi. Kenya might believe they have nothing to gain from an independent Somaliland; but according to Ahmed Esa, international recognition could "replace Kenya as the center for international assistance to Somalia,"³⁰ which could be used as incentive for Kenya.

iv. South Africa

As one of Africa's largest political, economic and diplomatic powers, South Africa plays a significant role in Somaliland's bid for recognition. President Nelson Mandela initiated and established Somaliland - South Africa relations. South Africa has observed firsthand Somaliland's democratic process on three occasions beginning in 2001 with the Constitutional referendum. In January 2003, South Africa followed the Presidential elections and found the results favorable. "The country has shown the African renaissance spirit of self-reliance and resilience and has produced a sustainable government and constitution," according to one observer.³¹ Comparisons of Somaliland's success to its southern counterpart's failure as a functioning state further emphasize

²⁶ Hussein Adam. Phone interview, 10 March 2006.

²⁷ For more information about Egypt, please refer to section II.B.

²⁸ For more information about the East Timor case study, please refer to Appendix A.

²⁹ Hussein Adam. Phone interview, 10 March 2006.

³⁰ Ahmed Esa. Email interview, 12 March 2006.

³¹ Iqbal Jhazbhay. "Somaliland: Africa's best kept secret, A challenge to the international community?" Institute for Security Studies. <http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/12No4/EJhazbhay.html>

Somaliland's democratic functionality. According to Iqbal Jhazbhay, "They have got their act together while in the south (Somalia) the TNG has been unable to do so."³² Most recently, a South African Observer Mission observed the Parliamentary elections in September 2005. Overall, South Africa has supported Somaliland's achievements to the extent possible within the African Union Charter, and they have been an important supporter of Somaliland's recognition. South Africa has found that Somaliland produces a strong case for recognition.

Besides the Western Sahara, Somaliland represents the "only unsettled political case in Africa where a country is being shaped on its original colonial boundaries."³³ The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) sets an interesting precedent, especially when viewing South Africa's role. South Africa ultimately recognized the SADR in September 2004, although 10 years after President Mandela had originally promised. A territory occupied by Morocco, Western Sahara's exiled government was able to receive support from one of Africa's key powers in its demand for a "referendum of self-determination", which is key when examining and pursuing Somaliland's own relations with South Africa.³⁴

President Thabo Mbeki's stance emphasized South Africa's important role as a neutral mediator in the Western Sahara conflict. South Africa had experienced strong pressure from Arab states and in particular PLO leader Yasser Arafat "to stop or at least pause the recognition."³⁵ Historically, the African National Congress (ANC) has strong and friendly ties with Palestine authorities largely due to sympathies toward the Palestinian struggle that parallels their own liberation struggle. After all, South Africa hosted a Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) conference where the "Declaration on Palestine" passed, calling for an immediate boycott of Israeli goods produced in the occupied territories.

However, South Africa's ruling ANC party has strongly supported the Sahrawi demand for a referendum on independence. In addition, South Africa is said to have leveraged the Sahrawi Republic's possible recognition to pressure Morocco into accepting the Baker Plan, a UN initiative to grant Western Sahara self-determination.³⁶

As a prominent figure in regional politics and with a commitment to peaceful resolution of conflicts, it would prove to be worthwhile to pursue continued relations with South Africa in an effort to gain a champion for Somaliland's cause within Africa. So far, South Africa has made no move to recognize Somaliland officially, but several factors, such as the positive fact-finding missions and President Mbeki's recent suggestion that the AU lead on resolving this case,³⁷ clearly illustrate South Africa's continued favorable involvement. Ultimately, by playing upon South Africa's sympathies towards self-

³² Ibid.

³³ Iqbal Jhazbhay. "African Union And Somaliland: Time to affirm -Africa best-kept secret?" *AwdalNews Network*. 3 April 2006.

³⁴ For more information about Western Sahara, please refer to Appendix A.

³⁵ "South Africa recognises Sahrawi Republic." *Afrol News*. 15 September 2004.
<http://www.afrol.com/articles/13959>

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Iqbal Jhazbhay. "Somaliland has strong case for recognition." *Sudan Tribune*. 4 April 2006.

determination Somaliland may bring South Africa fully to its side in the hopes that it may be the first to make a step towards recognition.

v. Egypt

The Somali coast and the Horn of Africa are critical to Egypt's interests. Egypt had recognized Somaliland's original independence in 1960, but now opposes an independent Somaliland and supports Somali unity. Egypt actively tried to convince Somaliland to participate in the Arta process, which aimed to unify Somali factions, initiated by the Djibouti government in 2000. As a result, Egypt is one of five countries that has recognized the TNG, continues to support the current TFG and consequently opposes an independent Somaliland.

Although Egypt has successfully blocked Somaliland in the Arab League, ultimately the Arab League's importance to Somaliland may be minor. For example, the Non-Aligned Movement's support and advocacy secured a PLO observer seat at the UN, and not the Arab League's advocacy.³⁸ Overall, according to Ahmed Egal, Egypt's strong opposition to Somaliland's international recognition will not outweigh the support it does garner in the African arena, since Egypt is not seen as a major player in African politics.³⁹

The importance of the Nile to Egypt should not be underestimated. Egypt has said that only an interference with the flow of Nile waters would provoke the nation to war.⁴⁰ Although the Nile has never been materially affected by any actions in Ethiopia, the Nile still carries great strategic and symbolic importance to Egypt, which explains Egypt's demand of its control.⁴¹

As a result, Egypt's strategic actions in the Red Sea are driven by fears of Ethiopia's intentions for the Nile. Many of Egypt's subsequent actions are based in its oppositional stance of Ethiopia. For example, Egypt supports Eritrea and encourages its hostility toward Ethiopia. It also works to oppose the Somaliland's recognition within the Arab League and African Union. By keeping Somaliland unrecognized and supporting a united Somalia, Egypt is attempting to create a counterweight to Ethiopia and to deny Ethiopia access to the sea.⁴² Its influence extends to other Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, possibly provoking that country's ban on Somaliland livestock.

However, Egypt's opposition to Somaliland's recognition extends beyond its interests in Ethiopia and the Nile. Egypt fears that Ethiopia, which was once a Jewish state, might give Israel a base in the region and control of trade through the Red Sea.⁴³ In the same respect, opposition to Somaliland stems from a fear that Somaliland's secular, democratic government may lead to cooperation with Israel. Such a connection could allow for

³⁸ Ahmed Egal. Email interview, 13 March 2006.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ HIH Prince Ermias Sahle-Selassie Haile-Selassie. "The Restoration of Stability Along the Red Sea is a Global Priority." The Crown Council of Ethiopia, 1999. <http://ethiopiancrown.org/archives.htm>

⁴¹ HIH Prince Ermias Sahle-Selassie Haile-Selassie. "Stability in the Horn of Africa: Strategic Security for the World." 8 April 2004.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

Israeli base military units and warships to dominate the Red Sea. Arab League members, such as Libya and Saudi Arabia, echo these fears.⁴⁴

Egypt's opposition to an independent Somaliland is highly unlikely to change. As such, Egypt is an unlikely ally and does not warrant focus. Although Egypt's strong opposition and influence on other Arab states is important to note, Somaliland's energies are best utilized in attaining support outside of Egypt.

vi. Saudi Arabia

Much of Saudi Arabia's action toward Somaliland has been the result of following Egypt and Arab League opposition. Traditionally, Saudi Arabia was the largest importer of Somaliland livestock. However, in 1998, Saudi Arabia banned Somaliland livestock exports, officially due to meat it said was infected with Rift Valley Fever. The Food and Agricultural Organization and World Health Organization have found no scientific evidence to prove such a notion.⁴⁵ Other Gulf States have in the meantime lifted the ban.

In efforts to appeal the ban, which has been a detriment to Somaliland economy, with no access to the Saudi Royal Family, Somaliland was unsuccessful in making its case in front of the Saudi government. Saudi Arabia is a major financial backer of the TFG, supports it within the Arab League, and reportedly provides money for military material despite the United Nations arms embargo, as did Libya and Qatar.⁴⁶ Although a powerful Arab entity, Saudi Arabia clearly has no intention of crossing neither Egypt nor Arab League opposition. As such, approaching Saudi Arabia for support seems futile.

vii. Nigeria

Nigeria has historically played and continues to play a leading role in African affairs. It remains a prominent member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union, contributing a significant number of troops to ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), especially in the Liberian and Sierra Leone civil wars.⁴⁷

According to Ahmed Egal, Nigeria's cautious support of Somaliland's case is quite important since both Nigeria and South Africa are black Africa's and therefore the African Union's two biggest political, diplomatic and economic powers.⁴⁸ Also, as Africa's most populous country and the world's eighth-largest oil exporter, Nigeria plays a leading role in regional politics. As such, it would be beneficial to further explore relations with Nigeria to better gauge their support and future involvement in Somaliland's case for recognition.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ David H. Shinn. "Somaliland: The Little Country that Could." *Addis Tribune*. 29 November 2002. <http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/sovereign/sover/emerg/2002/1129littlecountry.htm>

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Institute for Security Studies. "Nigeria – History and Politics" <http://www.iss.co.za/AF/profiles/Nigeria/Politics.html>

⁴⁸ Ahmed Egal. Phone interview, 13 March 2006.

viii. Yemen

Within Arab states, Yemen has perhaps the most interesting position in the Somalia/Somaliland issue. Yemen fervently supports of Somali unity. It also supported Jama Ali Jama, a rival of Somali President Yusuf in Puntland and was an important transport hub for small arms to Somalia and Somaliland despite an arms embargo.

Yemen - Somaliland relations deteriorated after the Arta process in Djibouti. Yemen accepted the Arab League position recognizing the TNG in Mogadishu and thus, relations with Somaliland soured. Since then, ties with Somalia have continued, including an official visit to Yemen by Somali President Abdullah Yusuf in November 2004 to discuss the bilateral relations and the Horn of Africa.⁴⁹ The Presidents reaffirmed Yemen's official support of maintaining unity of Somalia.

However, what makes Yemen key is its recent shift in relations with the de facto state. Although officially a supporter of Somali unity, Yemen is open to improving trade relations with Somaliland. In March 2006, Yemen and Somaliland signed a fishery agreement that includes cooperation efforts to strengthen economic and trade ties and work together to combat piracy in the Red Sea.⁵⁰ These efforts illustrate that Somaliland is not narrowly pursuing recognition, but looking to function as best it can as a de facto state and enhance bilateral trade relations. Ibrahim Othman Yousuf, a representative and investor from Somaliland sent to Yemen to discuss trade relations, stated that although "Yemen doesn't recognize Somaliland as an independent state doesn't mean we cannot work together for the mutual benefit of both parties."⁵¹

By initially focusing on the mutual benefits of economic and trade relations, Yemen could prove to be an important Arab supporter in the future. Unlike Egypt, Yemen has much to gain by ties with Somaliland. Agreements such as the fishery cooperation are a first step. Somaliland's emphasis on a symbiotic relationship with Yemen rather than solely lobbying them for political recognition could prove to be the proper channel to garner Yemen's support.

C. SOMALILAND AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

In examining opportunities presented by regional intergovernmental organizations, we find the African Union (AU) to offer more likely possibilities than either the Arab League (AL) or the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). While the AU has clear reservations about changes in state boundaries, it acknowledges that Somaliland's case is a unique - that of reverting to a pre-union state - and thus should not be characterized as a secessionist movement.⁵² Through active and persistent engagement, as well as a willingness to negotiate intermediary steps on the way to recognized statehood, we believe Somaliland can find an important partner in the AU.

⁴⁹ "Somalia in Spotlight." *Yemen Times*. Issue 788, 8 November 2004 to 10 November 2004.

⁵⁰ "Yemen and Somaliland Sign Fishery Agreement." *Yemen Observer*. 27 March 2006.

⁵¹ "Somaliland Seeks Open Trade with Yemen." *Yemen Times*. Issue 782, 18 October 2004 to 20 October 2004.

⁵² Report of the AU Fact-Finding Mission to Somaliland – 30 April to 4 May 2005.

The Arab League and the OIC present a second set of challenges. There is reportedly broad Arab state opposition to Somaliland's independence.⁵³ As the reasons for this are neither monolithic nor entirely clear, Arab states are still worth Somaliland pursuing at the bilateral level, in hopes of changing the institutional dynamics. In particular, Algeria has been suggested to be tentatively sympathetic.⁵⁴

i. African Union

The African Union recently sent a fact-finding mission to Somaliland in April 2005, which reported very positively about the situation in Somaliland and about its political future. Somaliland has since written a letter to the AU and AU Commission Chairpersons formally requesting AU membership. While Somaliland's case has not yet been on the formal agenda, there seems to be awareness that the issue will need to be discussed in the near future. With some persistence, Somaliland is likely to gain recognition, or at least steps toward recognition, through the AU. Steps toward recognition might be, for example, a status comparable to that of the Palestinian Authority: Somaliland would be able to carry out many functions of an ordinary national government and, as such, would be able to move forward in its development process.⁵⁵ A status of this sort could be an intermediary step toward full recognition of Somaliland's statehood.

Historical Context and Current Outlook

When the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was formed in 1964, one of its main objectives was "to safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity [of Member States]."⁵⁶ As such, the OAU and its descendant, the African Union, have generally been conservative in accepting any changes to state boundaries.

The Western Sahara, or Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) as the AU recognizes it, is an exception to this AU/OAU historical trend. In 1982, the OAU officially granted the SADR membership as an independent state. This action so infuriated Morocco, which claimed sovereignty over the land the Sahrawis represented, that Morocco officially withdrew from the OAU. To this day, Morocco is still not an official AU member, though it enjoys most of the same privileges as regular members.⁵⁷

In the few fairly recent cases where the AU or OAU accepted changes to state boundaries, the key issue has been the consent of the state parties involved. Thus in the case of the creation of Eritrea from a part of what was formerly Ethiopia, it was the Addis Ababa agreement that led the OAU and the international community more broadly to recognize the new state of Eritrea.

⁵³ See, for example, two pieces by Ahmed Egal, "Arab-African Competition in the Horn of Africa" and Untitled, respectively available at <http://www.radiosomaliland.com/index.php?itemid=223> and <http://www.radiosomaliland.com/index.php?itemid=205>. Also see Bashir Goth's "Will the Arabs Dare to Listen to Somaliland?" available at <http://www.awdalnews.com/wmview.php?ArtID=7059>.

⁵⁴ Ali Mazrui. Phone interview, 5 April 2006

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Charter of the OAU, Article II.

⁵⁷ For more detail on the Western Sahara comparison, see Appendix A.

However, Jean-Jacques Cornish recently argued in the *Mail & Guardian*, “signs of a new flexibility in African thinking on boundary issues are emerging.”⁵⁸ South African scholar Iqbal Jhazbhay is quoted in the article as likewise suggesting that the African Union’s approach to colonial boundaries is changing. “The AU-sponsored peace deal in Sudan allows for a referendum, five years from now, on whether the south wants to go it alone. This could not have happened if it were business as usual. The AU now goes for results, and takes account of subjective facts and practical realities.”⁵⁹

For whom “the unity of [Somalia] is sacrosanct”⁶⁰ the AU's new mood is worrisome. A few days after the *Mail & Guardian* reported on the recent AU Somaliland Mission Report,⁶¹ four Somali individuals with various political and professional associations (for example, one is a former BBC Somali Service staff member) put forth an “Open Letter to the Chairperson of the African Union on Somaliland Mission Report.” This letter, which refers to Somaliland as “the secessionist enclave in the North West region of Somalia,” argues that the writers of the AU Commission's recent report have “joined the wreckers of Somalia, notably the warlords and secessionists, in dismembering Somalia.”

The general expectation, regardless of opposition, is that the African Union is likely to recognize Somaliland. The question then is, when? Somaliland could be more proactive to move this process along. The AU Fact-Finding Mission Report notes that “[t]he authorities of Somaliland have... paid successive visits to the [AU] Commission in 2003, 2004, and early 2005, seeking an Observer status for Somaliland within the AU.” These visits are important and we think require persistence on Somaliland’s part. Somaliland should also continue to take the initiative in presenting its case to AU member states. In Somaliland’s application for AU membership, Somaliland’s President requests that the AU Chairperson and AU Commission Chairperson circulate the document to all member states. Somaliland can circulate the letter to member states itself. It may be the case that Somaliland has done this. However, we had a difficult time finding the AU letter; unless there is reason for it to be confidential, it might behoove Somaliland in gaining attention for its actions towards recognized statehood to make a document more widely available.

Somaliland’s letter to the AU formally requesting membership contains a few passages that strike as rather threatening to the AU. One section reads, “Negating the independence of Somaliland would lead to a new cycle of civil war between Somaliland and Somalia that would go on for years to come.” Also: “Posterity and African history would for generations to come blame the African Union for all the calamities that would ensue this wrong decision.” The first sentence may have strategic intent; the second, however, seems simply negative. Perhaps Somaliland’s case is better served through continuing to highlight the many positive aspects of recognition.

⁵⁸ Jean-Jacques Cornish. “AU Supports Somali Split.” *Mail and Guardian*. 21 February 2006
www.insidesomaliland.blogtales.com/archives/000534.html

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Mohsin Mahad et al. “Open Letter to the Chairperson of the African Union on Somaliland Mission Report” *AwdalNews*. <http://www.awdalnews.com/wmprint.php?ArtID=6909>

⁶¹ Report of the AU Fact-Finding Mission to Somaliland – 30 April to 4 May 2005

Ali Mazrui suggested to us that one forum through which Somaliland might raise its profile within the AU is hearings on Somaliland's status.⁶² Such hearings would invite a variety of knowledgeable individuals to speak on the issue; not only government representatives, but academics and other actors without direct political involvement, could offer perspectives on the case.

ii. League of Arab States

Seeking recognition through membership to the League of Arab States (Arab League) is not likely to be worthwhile. Both Egypt and Saudi Arabia oppose Somaliland's statehood. As these two governments wield substantial power within the Arab League, recognition is highly unlikely.⁶³

Historical Context and Current Outlook

Seven Arab states (Egypt, Iraq, Transjordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen) formed the Arab League in 1945 with the purposes of "strengthening [...] the relations between the member-states, the coordination of their policies in order to achieve co-operation between them and to safeguard their independence and sovereignty; and a general concern with the affairs and interests of the Arab countries."⁶⁴ Somalia joined the Arab League in 1974.

Arab League treatment of the case of Western Sahara is useful here. The Arab League, unlike the AU, does not recognize the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. It rather considers the Western Sahara to be a part of Morocco, one of its member-states.

The case of Palestine, of course, offers a rather opposite treatment by the Arab League of the issue of self-determination. The Arab League has since its inception been more vocal in its support of Palestine independence than perhaps any other issue. This precedent should not be taken as generally applicable, however, since the Palestinian question holds a clearly unique location in the politics of Arab states.

The Arab League officially recognizes the TFG as the leadership of Somalia. There is currently a Somali Ambassador to the Arab League from the TFG. Nonetheless, there was an Arab League election observer in Somaliland during the parliamentary elections.⁶⁵ Following the elections, the Arab League reportedly sent a representative to Hargeisa (in October 2005), who congratulated the Somaliland government on the elections.

iii. Organization of the Islamic Conference

Saudi Arabia wields the most power in the OIC. For this reason, OIC recognition of Somaliland is not likely to be forthcoming, unless Saudi Arabia can be convinced. Saudi Arabia may wish to respect Egypt's influence in the Horn of Africa and as such is aligning with Egypt's support of the TFG and opposition to Somaliland's statehood. It

⁶² Ali Mazrui. Phone interview, 6 April 2006.

⁶³ Ahmed Egal. Email interview, 13 March 2006.

⁶⁴ Charter of the League of Arab States, Article II.

⁶⁵ Steve Kibble. "Somaliland: The Post-Election Path." Talk presented at the UK House of Commons on 10 January 2006.

also may share broader Arab state concern about fragmentation.⁶⁶ It would be interesting, however, to consider whether a change in position by Yemen might affect the Saudi stance. While Saudi Arabia and Yemen have struggled with territorial disputes and other issues in the past, they have lately aligned themselves more closely. If Yemen's position vis-à-vis Somaliland can be changed due to the sheer number of Somali refugees, perhaps the same strategy can be used to persuade Saudi Arabia.

Historical Context and Current Outlook

The OIC was established in Rabat, Morocco in September 1969 by leaders of Islamic states in response to an arson attempt in August of that year on the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Al-Quds/Jerusalem. Under the OIC's Charter, adopted two years later, the Organization's primary goals are "to promote solidarity among all member states" through cooperation at various levels. In laying out principles to guide OIC activities, the Charter specifically calls for "observation of the right to self-determination and non-interference in the internal affairs of Member States" and "observation of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of each State." These principles do not lend themselves to sympathy for Somaliland's case especially given that the OIC has recognized Somalia in the form of the TNG (see below).

Additionally, the OIC does not have tremendous organizational capacity. One key initial focus was to support the Palestinians and work toward ending Israel's occupation. With little progress in that realm and no change in the OIC's position on Israel/Palestine issues, some critics see the OIC as stagnant politically and institutionally.⁶⁷ If this is the case generally, then the OIC is unlikely to take a progressive/controversial stance on Somaliland. There is a Somali Ambassador to the OIC from the TNG. The TNG had representation at the 2003 OIC Summit.

D. INITIATIVES OF COOPERATION

The initiatives of cooperation arise from the belief that Somaliland's recognition as a state and future development and prosperity are tied to the development of the Horn of Africa region as a whole. Somaliland can engage with its neighbors in the Horn and take the lead in cooperative efforts through three main avenues: the environment, health, and the status of refugees.

i. Environment Initiative

A potential regional cooperative initiative that Somaliland can use in its bid for international recognition is via the active and vocal international environmental lobby. Somaliland is one of only two entirely arid regions in Africa and home to both endemic and endangered plant and animal species. As such, a Somaliland environment initiative is committed to stewardship of the environment while also harnessing important geographical capital to raise awareness to the cause of international recognition.

⁶⁶ Ali Mazrui. Phone interview, 6 April 2006.

⁶⁷ See, for example, Dr. Minhaj A. Qidwai's editorial piece at <http://www.ilaam.net/Opinions/OICVisionFor2050.html>

Somaliland has taken small steps in forming environmental protection policy, such as the January 2005 policy banning plastic bags⁶⁸ used primarily for storing and selling ‘qat’. In a March 2005 evaluation of the ban, the Somaliland Information Minister acknowledged that “[t]he bags have not only become an environmental problem, but also an eyesore.”⁶⁹ Although the plastic bag ban was not completely successful, the existence of such a policy shows willingness and concern on environmental issues.

Somaliland can continue to build and improve its environmental capital by beginning to secure and designate environmentally important areas as biosphere reserves. One NGO, Conservation International, calls the Horn region a “biodiversity hotspot”⁷⁰ with a large number of endemic plant and animal species. The region is unique due to its extreme aridity. Conservation and environmental activists realize that without state sponsored policies to protect Somaliland’s endemic plants and animals there is serious threat to its status as a biodiversity hotspot. Using the environmental lobby to place pressure on the international community would be a unique and creative strategy in Somaliland’s process for international recognition.

Map 1: Horn of Africa regional map⁷¹

(Areas shaded in red indicate extremely arid areas with endemic plant & animal species)



The idea of biosphere reserves goes back to the UNESCO’s 1968 Biosphere Conference. Under the framework of UNESCO’s 1970 Programme on Man and the Biosphere

⁶⁸ *AwdalNews* Wardheer News Editorial. “Banning Plastic Bags in Somaliland is a Step in the Right Direction.” March 2005. <http://www.awdalnews.com/wmview.php?ArtID=4914>

⁶⁹ *AwdalNews* “Somaliland still blighted by plastic bags, despite ban.” March 2005 <http://www.awdalnews.com/wmview.php?ArtID=5053>

⁷⁰ Conservation International. “Horn of Africa Biodiversity Hotspot.” http://www.biodiversityhotspots.org/xp/Hotspots/horn_africa/index.xml

⁷¹ Source: Conservation International

(MAB)⁷², biosphere reserves are defined as “areas of terrestrial and coastal/marine ecosystems or a combination thereof”⁷³. Internationally recognized reserves can seek out grants from and the support of environmental organizations. In addition, the biosphere program grew from the need “to reconcile conservation of biodiversity and biological resources with their sustainable use.” The Seville Strategy for Biosphere Reserves also believes that effective natural resource management is the joint mandate of “natural and social scientist; conservation and development groups; management authorities and local communities – all working together on this complex issue.”⁷⁴

Biosphere reserves are nominated by national governments and must meet a minimal set of criteria and conditions⁷⁵ before admittance to UNESCO’s MAB Network. Although nomination is limited to the scope of states, Somaliland’s efforts to recognize the importance and value in designating land tracts as biosphere reserves is further evidence to support Somaliland’s statehood recognition. Somaliland’s 15-year struggle to be recognized as a state has been prolonged partly due to invisibility on the international stage. “UNESCO recognition can serve to highlight and reward... efforts,” not only in environmental sustainability and conservation but also in terms of democratic governance and the value of Somaliland as a state. “The biosphere reserve concept can be used as a framework to guide and reinforce projects to enhance people's livelihoods and ensure environmental sustainability.”⁷⁶

Although Somaliland has limited financial resources to use towards an environmental initiative, “[d]esignation of a site as a biosphere reserve can raise awareness among local people, citizens and government authorities on environmental and development issues. It can help attract additional funding from different sources.”⁷⁷ “Many biosphere reserve[s] ... especially those in developing countries ... do not have the capacity nor the resources [and] ... are therefore encouraged to seek funding in the form of projects and/or endowment funds from appropriate donor countries, multilateral funding sources (such as UNDP, GEF), regional development banks or agencies and, in certain cases, the private sector.”⁷⁸

⁷² Biosphere Reserves FAQ. http://www.unesco.org/mab/faq_br.shtml

⁷³ Seville Strategy for Biosphere Reserves “Biosphere Reserves: The First Twenty Years.” (p. 3).

<http://www.unesco.org/mab/doc/Strategy.pdf>

⁷⁴ Seville Strategy. (p. 2)

⁷⁵ Ibid. Each biosphere reserve is intended to fulfill three complementary functions: conservation (to preserve genetic resources, species, ecosystems and landscapes); development (to foster sustainable economic and human development); and logistic support (to support demonstration projects, environmental education and training, and research and monitoring related to local, national, and global issues of conservation and sustainable development). Each biosphere reserve needs 1) a core area (securely protected site for conserving biological diversity, monitoring minimally disturbed ecosystems, and undertaking non-destructive research and other low-impact uses such as education), 2) a clearly identified buffer zone (which surrounds the core area and can be used for sound ecological practices like environmental education, recreation, ecotourism, applied basic research) and 3) a flexible transition area (which may contain a variety of agricultural activities, settlements, local communities).

⁷⁶ UNESCO. Biosphere Reserves FAQ http://www.unesco.org/mab/faq_br.shtml

⁷⁷ Biosphere Reserves op. cit.

⁷⁸ UNESCO. Guiding Principles for Projects on Biosphere Reserves. (p. 1)

http://www.unesco.org/mab/BRs/pdf/Guid_princip.pdf

“The [biosphere reserve] network is a key component in MAB’s objective for achieving a sustainable balance between the sometimes conflicting goals of conserving biological diversity, promoting economic development, and maintaining associated cultural values.”⁷⁹ As of July 2005, the biosphere network includes 482 biosphere reserves in 102 countries. In the Horn of Africa region, UNESCO’s MAB network includes six biosphere reserves in Kenya and one in Yemen– the Socotra Archipelago.

In terms of raising funds for its environment initiative, Somaliland can follow the precedent set by Yemen, its neighbor in the Horn, with the recent “programme for Sustainable Development and Biodiversity Conservation for the People of the Socotra Islands [which] was signed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The programme, financed by UNDP, the Government of Italy and the Yemen Government, will collectively contribute over US\$5 million to continue to support the people of Socotra through conservation and sustainable use of the islands' unique biodiversity and natural resources for the next five years.”⁸⁰

ii. Health Initiative

A proposed Somaliland-led health initiative could be a strong strategy to bring together countries in the Horn that also share historical alliances, environmental climate, ethno-cultural and economic ties, as a means to bundle together efforts and resources to counter drought, famine, and meet healthcare needs.

In 1991, Somalia ranked 161 out of 163 least developed countries with respect to healthcare. When Somaliland declared independence from Somalia, most hospitals in the capital city Hargeisa were destroyed during the 1988-91 civil war and the country lost many of its health professionals. Additionally, “Hargeisa saw 90% of its structures destroyed in the war.”⁸¹ In Somaliland, one in eight babies die before the age of 12 months, 4,000 Somali women die in childbirth every year, and average life expectancy is 48 years. Clearly, healthcare is an important development concern. Additionally, recent news about populations affected by severe drought, famine, loss of livestock (the main livelihood for a majority of the nomadic populations of Somaliland, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Somalia), and the severe lack of vaccinations for children with diseases such as measles⁸² (which is exacerbated by drought and famine) indicate how healthcare is an important concern for each country in the Horn.

While each country in the Horn has separate partnerships with NGOs to meet healthcare needs, Somaliland can make a difference by leading a health initiative that will aim to share information, medical expertise, and diffuse the burden of regional natural disasters.

⁷⁹ Seville Strategy. (p. 1)

⁸⁰ Mats Thulin. “Horn of Africa” chapter from *Hotspots Revisited: Earth's Biologically Richest and Most Endangered Terrestrial Ecoregions*. Cemex Books on Nature
<http://www.biodiversityscience.org/publications/hotspots/TheHornofAfrica.html>

⁸¹ King’s College Hospital. “King’s THET Somaliland Partnership.” <http://www.kingsch.nhs.uk/ktsp>

⁸² Vaccine coverage among children for measles is about 38% in Somaliland and Somalia; a recent UNICEF & WHO vaccinations campaign targets 2.5 million children in the area. March 2006. *AwdalNews*
<http://www.awdalnews.com/wmview.php?ArtID=6971>

For example, in Ethiopia, the Ethiopian Red Cross Society (ERCS) is involved in national immunization programs, the Danish Red Cross is responsible for health delivery by the government, Save the Children Denmark focuses on education, and the Lutheran World Federation is concerned with agricultural issues. In 1997, realizing the interconnectedness of these health sector issues, the above organizations developed a joint action plan and joint monitoring matrix. In 2001, Ethiopia's Ministry of Health began mass vaccinations to offset a major meningitis epidemic while Somaliland's meningitis epidemic and cholera outbreak was curtailed by the World Health Organization (WHO), Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and UNICEF intervening. It is evident that there is no concerted effort in the Horn to alleviate the health problems that all the countries share equally.

A Somaliland-led health initiative can build on the example of the Tropical Health and Education Trust (THET), a UK-based nonprofit established in 1988 whose mission is to "provide training for frontline health workers and the poorest settings and [to] develop the institutional capacity of local health institutions."⁸³ THET network includes 16 UK-based hospitals that train local staff and share medical practices with local hospitals in eight African countries. Somaliland's Edna Adan Maternity Hospital and the Hargeisa Group Hospital are linked with UK's King's College Hospital (KCH) with special focus to address high maternal and child morbidity and mortality. Amongst other countries in the Horn, Ethiopia has several links (through THET) with UK-based hospitals. The THET network of ties is important to support the individual country's healthcare delivery needs (provision of materials and collaboration) and is a valuable feature to use in the Somaliland-led health initiative to strengthen regional collaboration.

Another valuable precedent in regional environmental initiatives pertains to the Pastoral and Environmental Network in the Horn of Africa (PENHA), an NGO founded in 1989 and committed to the issues of pastoralists – both in terms of livelihood and environment. Somaliland/Somalia is part of the PENHA network, along with Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan and Uganda, which means Somaliland participates with de facto recognition. PENHA's work clearly indicates that there are pressures and constraints shared by the regional state players for a group of people (nomadic and pastoral) that comprise almost 65% of the population.⁸⁴ Somaliland's participation and efforts in regional leadership will be central to getting recognition as a state. As much as Somaliland continues to act and perform like a state, the stronger will be its legal and moral case for international recognition as a state.

Although WHO does have a Horn of Africa Initiative (HOAI) that includes the area where "Somaliland borders with Djibouti and the Somali Region of Ethiopia,"⁸⁵ Somaliland is considered a part of Somalia and not a de facto state. Somaliland's status (as conferred by other international NGOs like UNICEF) is simply as the northwest

⁸³ The Tropical Health and Education Trust (THET). <http://www.thet.org/>

⁸⁴ Isabel Booth. "Somali radio soap for health education." July 2003. The Communication Initiative <http://www.comminit.com/strategicthinking/steval/sld-2175.html>

⁸⁵ Dr. Abdullahi M. Ahmed. "Report on Visit to Hargeisa, Somaliland." February 2002. World Health Organisation Horn of Africa Initiative. (p. 2)

region of Somalia. This default status has to be challenged and can be changed by a Somaliland-led health initiative, which would demonstrate to the neighbors and the international community that Somaliland is committed to its responsibilities as a state. While Somaliland is currently incapable of providing funds to counter these regional health threats, the health initiative would aim to pool medical expertise to counter these common pressures. The health initiative is a way for Somaliland to venture beyond short-term political goals to a long-term solution where it sees a shared future with Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Somalia made possible only via cooperation. A Somaliland-led health initiative could be an example of development via cooperation, health as an issue that affects all equally and deeply, and in the words of Dr. Abdullahi M. Ahmed, "health as a bridge for peace."

iii. Refugee Initiative

More than 230,000 Somali refugees still dwell in the Horn of Africa region (see map for details). In fact, people are still leaving Somalia today. In 2005, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) registered over 15,000 new arrivals in Yemen.⁸⁶ Somalis cross the Gulf of Aden under life-threatening circumstances. Last February, at least 33 people died when a smuggler forced them into deep water off the coast.⁸⁷

The original refugee population of the civil war was mainly from Somaliland, as this was where the war's brutality was felt strongest. Almost a million refugees left the region. Currently 15,000 refugees still live in north Ethiopia's refugee camps alone, many of them presumably Somalilanders. Djibouti shelters almost 9,000 Somali refugees, Yemen the staggering number of 63,511.


Refugees place strain on host societies on several levels. Economically, host countries carry the largest burden. A 2002 UNHCR comparative study calculated the ratio Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in the host country to number of refugees by dividing the number of refugees by GDP/capita.⁸⁸ It found that of 141 countries, Ethiopia ranked fourth with a ratio of 1,975. The high ratio reflects both low GDP/capita and a high contingent of refugees. Yemen ranked 20th with a ratio of 128; Germany, the highest-ranked industrialized country, was 37th with 39.7. The fact that most Somali refugees in neighboring countries live in camps significantly increases their hosts' burden. Additionally, large refugee populations can be socially disruptive, as the local population does not always accept the influx of newcomers. The fact that refugees receive aid (they are usually banned from working outside of camps) can be a cause for anger and envy. If Somaliland were recognized, all Somaliland refugees now living in neighboring countries could be asked to return, easing strain on host countries.

Somaliland is already accepting voluntary returnees. According to Refugees International, about 800,000 Somali refugees who fled to Ethiopia during the civil war have since voluntarily returned – primarily to Somaliland, because it is more stable and secure.

⁸⁶ UNHCR. "Major mass registration of refugees and asylum seekers in Sanaa, Yemen ends." March 2006.

⁸⁷ UNHCR press briefing in Geneva, 28 February 2006.

⁸⁸ UNHCR, "Selected Indicators measuring Capacity and Contributions of Host Countries" April 2002.



UNHCR conducts limited repatriation campaigns to “North-West Somalia”, encouraging Somalilanders to return (e.g. by organizing “go and see visits”).

In Europe, the UK signed agreements with Somaliland that commit the country to take back declined asylum seekers.⁸⁹ This is an interesting development: The signing of agreements about acceptance of deportees normally is limited to internationally recognized states. Somalia still qualifies as a country whose adverse living conditions are a reason not to deport a rejected asylum seeker, thus deporting to Somaliland is an implicit recognition.

The situation of returnees in Somaliland is not very good. They live in makeshift housing in camps and often suffer malnutrition and other health problems.⁹⁰ UNHCR and UNDP complain that donor support for reintegration programs is “reluctant at best”.

Despite dire conditions for its own returnees, Somaliland is also taking in refugees originally from the south. Somaliland could take care more adequately of the refugees if it was a recognized state. First, UNHCR and Somaliland agree that southern refugees need assistance and should be included in the relocation program for returnees, but local authorities are reluctant to allocate land, for fear of creating a pull factor attracting more southerners than the country could handle. Recognized borders would give the government and UN agencies better control over who enters the country and the camps. Second, the international community defines people from southern Somalia living in Somaliland as “Internally Displaced Persons” (IDPs). No United Nations or other international agency has official responsibility for responding to internal displacement. Were Somaliland recognized, the displaced people from the south would be “Refugees”, a status that would enable the Somaliland government to appeal for larger international funds and to improve the lives of the people looking for shelter in Hargeisa.⁹¹ International organizations, whose mandate stipulates that they help refugees but not IDPs, would be able to assist, too.

Somaliland could pledge to take all Somaliland refugees back immediately - and preferably more southerners, too, thus providing an incentive for countries like Ethiopia, Yemen and Kenya to recognize it. Refugees who are today fleeing to Yemen, where they can register as refugees, would not have to give their lives in smugglers hands. Obviously, Somaliland would need a strong UNHCR commitment to support these efforts. The IDPs from the south are, according to Refugees International, at risk of discrimination due to the bitter feelings left by the war. Somaliland should put safeguards against discrimination versus refugees and IDPs from the south, acting as a responsible state and respecting human rights.

Somaliland's willingness to keep its doors open for people from Somalia is a clear sign that it does not want to sever all ties and live in enmity, but envisions partnership and friendship with the south.

⁸⁹ “Most Asylum Seekers ‘come to UK because Lives are in Danger’” *Sunday Herald* 13 Jun 2004.

⁹⁰ Somaliland Assistance Bulletin December 2005, UNOCHA.

⁹¹ Ahmed Esa. Email interview, 12 March 2006.

III. Appendices

A. CASE STUDIES

i. Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic/Western Sahara

The process by which the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) gained recognition by and membership into the OAU is useful to note as Somaliland attempts to gain recognition through the AU framework. However, the Western Sahara case does not set a clear precedent for Somaliland.

The Sahrawi Republic had already been recognized by 26 individual OAU member states, as well as nearly 20 non-African states, when it was granted membership into the OAU itself. As such, its case differs significantly from Somaliland's, where recognition by individual states is lacking. Further, SADR had the important benefit of Algeria, an OAU member state, Algeria, willing to champion its cause. Algeria's motivations arguably were (and continue to be) more motivated by wanting to contain Morocco's territorial ambitions than with concern for the Sahrawis.

Ethiopia's role could parallel Algeria's in this respect. Somaliland's recognition will serve Ethiopia's self-interest concerning the 'Greater Somalia' movement. Ethiopia is thus far unwilling to play this role, as it maintains an interest in friendly relations with Somalia as well as Somaliland. Still, it is worth noting the domino effect created by the first recognition of the Sahrawi Republic. Once Madagascar offered recognition, a host of other states quickly followed, with more than ten states recognizing the Sahrawi Republic within the year. It is relevant that the first state to recognize SADR was Madagascar, a significantly less interested party than Algeria, who then followed with recognition a few days later. In Somaliland's case, with Ethiopia having made clear that it will not be first to recognize, a more neutral state is needed to take this step. Maybe this is South Africa, already a vocal supporter. Another option is to target smaller states that would not directly gain from Somaliland's recognition, but at the same time would not lose by being sympathetic.

ii. Indonesia - East Timor

The East Timorese case study has several lessons for Somaliland, specifically the importance of having an active, organized and vocal diaspora.

East Timor's struggle for liberation and recognition was strengthened by four factors that Somaliland unfortunately does not share. First, East Timor had a constant international ally in Portugal as it remained under Portuguese administration throughout the 24-year Indonesian occupation. Second, East Timor has an important source of revenue (and with it, world interest) from petroleum and oil resources, which was used as strategic advantage during its diplomatic attempts to gain freedom and recognition. Third, although the United Nations intervened and provided transitional governance and material resources only after the East Timorese referendum secured freedom from Indonesia, it was a powerful lobby for gaining international recognition.

Fourth and most important, is the active, organized and highly vocal role of the East Timorese diaspora who, unable to live and work in Dili, sought refuge in other Portuguese colonies (Mozambique and Angola) and regional neighbors like Australia. From these distant locations, the Timorese diaspora – “[m]any of them... newly escaped youth – were active in bringing the Timorese issue to the notice of national governments and peoples. Thousands of solidarity groups worked closely with the diaspora to put pressure on their own governments and the United Nations to take action to force Indonesia to withdraw from East Timor.”⁹² It is ironic that since Somaliland is relatively stable and increasingly offers a reason and the means for Somaliland diaspora to return to Hargeisa, they are unable to be as vocal a diaspora group as the Timorese diaspora were. Additionally, the Timorese diaspora overwhelmingly believed in the need for East Timor’s independence and thus had a united voice. For several reasons not fully explicable, the Somaliland diaspora is divided on the issue of Somaliland’s independence from Somalia. In our research concerning diaspora activism, we had problems getting information on networks organized specifically for Somaliland’s cause.

iii. Ethiopia - Eritrea

While both Somaliland and Eritrea share a similar colonial past, the biggest difference between the two is that during the decolonization in 1960, Somaliland enjoyed a brief five day period when it was independent. In contrast, Eritrean decolonization resulted in a federal type government that was part of the Kingdom of Ethiopia. Secondly, Somaliland’s current independence is the product of non-violent democratic means differing from Eritrea’s 30-year war and liberation movement. This divergence in histories speaks to the vastly different political cultures in Somaliland and Eritrea. Thirdly, Eritrean independence was achieved through the negotiated consent of Ethiopia. Somaliland at present has no means of obtaining consent from Somalia since it is a failed state. Although since 2004, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is attempting to administer Somalia, there is no political unity concerning Somaliland.⁹³

⁹² “Xanana Gusmão and the Resistance Movement” and www.freetimor.org from <http://www.labyrinth.net.au/~ftimor/progtxt.html>

⁹³ Hussein Adam. Phone interview, 10 March 2006.

B. LOOSE THREADS

Following are three ideas that do not fall within the framework of the report, but may warrant further exploration.

The Chinese Connection

The idea to use China's financial aid for Somaliland development is based on a recent trend of China investing in Africa. Chinese business interests are visible in Sierra Leone (hotels), Tanzania/Zambia (railway) and Uganda (construction, mining).⁹⁴ The African countries' new investment relationship with China is devoid of ideological baggage, which is diametrically opposite to the long colonial relationship with the west. Ultimately, "[t]he Chinese come to Africa as equals, with no colonial hangover, no complex relationship or resentment. China wants to buy; Africa has something to sell."⁹⁵ Somaliland could seek out Chinese investments for its continued development with research and mining for oil, as well as growth and expansion of port Berbera. The Chinese are well-known for their achievements in poverty reduction – over the last two decades, 400 million Chinese have been brought out of poverty. This is another sector for Somaliland – China dialogue. At the same time, Somaliland should keep in mind and take advantage of the west's cautionary stance toward China's growing global importance. Opening Somaliland's doors to Chinese investments might entice western countries to compete for similar opportunities. Somaliland could use this strategic card in its diplomatic efforts to gain international recognition.

Employing Conflicting Views On Israeli Influence

Israeli influence is an important issue within Africa, among Muslim and non-Muslim states alike. For example, although South Africa has ties to Palestine through its sympathies of a liberation struggle, it also has significant economic ties to Israel. Israel is South Africa's largest trading partner in the Middle East and vice-versa. These economic ties are growing in spite of the South African Palestinian solidarity movement and Israel's historic role in fueling the Apartheid regime (arms sales). South African - Israeli involvement viewed in light of Egypt's fears of Israeli influence in the continent highlights a sensitive but strategic focus for Somaliland's dealings with the Arab League or OIC. Somaliland should stress that its secular, democratic government need not mean a susceptibility to Israeli interests in the Horn of Africa. On the opposing side, Somaliland may emphasize this secular government and a possible relationship with Israel when approaching the US, UK, or even South Africa.

Poetry Festival in Somaliland

The Somali people's rich tradition of poetry and story telling could be featured in an international poetry festival in Somaliland. I.M. Lewis writes,

Poetry, it should be added, today as much as in the past, plays a vital part in Somali culture, and the extensive use of radio broadcasting as enhanced rather than diminished its significance. Often a poem is not

⁹⁴ Lindsey Hilsum. "We Love China" in *The View from Africa* ed. Ian Jack et al. *Granta* #92, Winter 2005. London and New York: Granta Publications. (pp. 233-240)

⁹⁵ *Ibid.* (p.240)

merely the private voice of the author, but frequently the collective tongue of a pressure group, and **propaganda either for peace or for war is more effectively spread through poetry than by any other means.**⁹⁶ (Emphasis added)

Their cultural heritage, in particular the extensive oral literature, connects Somalis across state borders and political divides. To organize – with the financial assistance of arts and culture NGOs or UNESCO – an international Somali poetry festival to which high-ranking politicians from African states are invited serves multiple purposes: Somaliland presents itself as a country that sees beyond political objectives and wants to preserve the joint culture. Including Somalia in this event is a step toward reconciliation without giving up independence. And even if the festival cannot openly be used for promotion of Somaliland's international recognition, it brings AU members states to the country and in contact with Somaliland officials.

⁹⁶ I.M. Lewis. "A modern history of the Somali". 2002. (p.5)

C. DIASPORA AND EXPERTS CONTACT INFORMATION

Somali Diaspora							
Country	Location	Organization	Contact Person	Contact Details	Reply to Inquiry	Size	Notes
USA	Los Angeles, CA	Somaliland Policy and Reconstruction Institute	Saeed Maygag Samater, Chairman	ssamater@sopri.org	No		Next conference on Somaliland scheduled for 6-9 September 2006
			Mohamed Nur	sopri@cox.net	Yes		
		SupportSomaliland	Nuradin Mohamed Abdi, Chairman; Abdiqadir Adan-Dheere, Treasurer				
		Somaliland Support Association	Ahmed A. Jire				
	Minnesota	Confederation of Somali Community in MN (CSCM)			No	Minnesota is home to the country's largest population of Somali residents. Approx. 35-40,000	Not Somaliland specific
		Somali Justice Advocacy Center	Omar Jamal	shabeej@yahoo.com	No		Not Somaliland specific
	Seattle, WA	Northwest Somaliland Society				Approx. several thousand from Somaliland	Community Center and Community Services, non-political
	Clarkston, GA (Atlanta suburb)	Somali Community Development Organization	Abdullahi Abdullahi	(404) 508-0390, www.somalibantu.com			For Somali Bantu refugee population
	Boston, MA	Somali Development Center	Abdirahman A. Yusuf	sdcbboston@yahoo.com aaayusuf@sdcbboston.org	Fwd. to Adan-Dheri		

Somali Diaspora							
Country	Location	Organization	Contact Person	Contact Details	Reply to Inquiry	Size	Notes
			Ahmed M. Adan-Dheri	adheri@comcast.net	Yes		
	Fairfax, VA	Somali Family Care Network	Raqiya Abdalla	raqiya@somalifamily.org	No		List of orgs in US: www.somalifamily.org/SCBOContacts.htm
Canada	Toronto, ON	Somaliland Forum	Deqa G. Hidir Farah, Chairwoman	chair@somalilandforum.com	No		
	Scarborough-Agincourt		MP Jim Karygiannis	jim@karygiannismp.com	Yes	200 families	Active Somaliland constituency who have traveled to Hargeisa and hosted Foreign Minister
			Farah Khayre	fkhayre@yahoo.co.uk	Yes/ No		Contact through Karygiannis
UK		Somaliland International Recognition Action Group, SIRAG:	Lulu Farah, Chairwoman	sirag.uk@hotmail.com	Yes		
	London		Mohamed Omar	momar@hotmail.co.uk	Yes/ No		Article: Somaliland's Disheartening Foreign Policy Needs an Overhaul, AwdalNews 2006
	Cardiff					8,000 Somalis, 99% from Somaliland	
	Wales					10,000 Somalis	

Experts on Somali & Somaliland Affairs							
Country	Location	Name	Affiliation	Telephone	Email	Reply to Inquiry	
						Publications etc	
USA	Michigan	Sisay Asefa	Western Michigan University		Asefa@wmich.edu	Yes/ No	The Horn of Africa: Background, Scope and Regional Initiatives, 2003
	Minneapolis, MN	Abdi Ismail Samatar	Professor of Geography		samat001@umn.edu	Yes	ICG Report on Somaliland: An Alternative Somali Response, 2003 - AGAINST independent Somaliland
	Minnesota	Ahmed Ismail Samatar	Professor, Macalester College	(612) 626-1877	samatar@macalester.edu	Yes	ICG Report on Somaliland: An Alternative Somali Response, 2003 - AGAINST independent Somaliland
	New Jersey	Jeffrey Herbst	Princeton University		herbst@princeton.edu	No	States and Power in Africa, 2000
	New York	Richard Ford	Clark University	(646) 706-1808	rford@clarku.edu	Yes	Removing Barricades in Somalia, USIP, 1998
	Washington, DC	David Shinn	Former US Ambassador to Ethiopia	(202) 543-1588	dshinn@earthlink.net	Yes	The Horn of Africa: Where does Somaliland fit in?, Seminar in Umea, 8 March 2003
	Washington, DC	Lange Schermerhorn	Former US Ambassador to Djibouti	(202) 362-7093	schmerhorn@hotmail.com	Yes	
	Washington, DC	Dave Peterson	Director Africa, National Endowment for Democracy		dave@ned.org	Yes	
	Washington, DC	Jeff Krilla	International Republican Institute		africa@iri.org	No	
	Worcester, MA	Hussein Adam	Holy Cross College	(508) 793-3409	hadam@holycross.edu	Yes	Removing Barricades in Somalia, USIP, 1998
							Formation and Recognition of new states: Somaliland in Contrast to Eritrea
	Binghamton, NY	Ali Mazrui	SUNY Binghamton	(607) 777-4494	amazrui@binghamton.edu	Yes	Visit to Hargeisa and the AU in March 2006

Experts on Somali & Somaliland Affairs							
Country	Location	Name	Affiliation	Telephone	Email	Reply to Inquiry	Publications etc
USA		Mohamed Rashid			rashid108@hotmail.com		
UK		Anthony Carroll and B. Rajagopal					American University Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol. 8: 653, 1993 - legal analysis
		Steve Kibble	Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR) and Somaliland Focus		steve@progressio.org.uk	Yes	
		I.M. Lewis	Prof. Emeritus, London School of Economics		ioanlewis2@btinternet.com	Yes/ No	A Modern History of the Somali 1965, 2002 Building the Somaliland Republic, 2005
Other	Bonn, Germany	Ulif Terlinden	www.state-failure.de		ulf@ulf-terlinden.de	No	Deceptive Hope for Peace? The Horn of Africa between Crisis Diplomacy and Obstacles to Development, 2004
	Frankfurt, Germany	Dustin Dehez	Dusseldorf Institute for Foreign and Security Policy (DIAS)	+49 (69) 9459-7520	dudehez@hotmail.com	Yes	PINR Report 2006: Somaliland and the Issue of International Recognition
	Hargeisa, Somaliland	Ahmed H. Esa	Director, Institute of Research and Practical Training		ahesa@rocketmail.com	Yes	Esa is the Foreign Minister of the opposition party Kulmiye
	Nairobi, Kenya	Matt Bryden	International Crisis Group		mbryden@crisisgroup.org		Somaliland: Democratization and its Discontents, Africa Report 66, 28 July 2003
	Pretoria, South Africa	Iqbal Jhazbhay	University of South Africa	+27 (82) 880-8603	jhazbmid@unisa.ac.za, iqbal_jhazbhay@yahoo.co.uk	Yes/ No	African Union and Somaliland, Sub-Saharan Informer, 17 March 2006
	Tokyo, Japan	Mitsugi Endo	Tokyo University		endo@waka.c.u-tokyo.ac.jp		

Experts on Somali & Somaliland Affairs							
Country	Location	Name	Affiliation	Telephone	Email	Reply to Inquiry	Publications etc
Other		Guled Ismail			halvey@btinternet.com	Yes	The Sool Issue, Somaliland Times Issue 210
		Yvette Lopez			lopez.yvette@gmail.com	Yes	
		Bashir Goth	Awdal News		news@awdalnews.com		
		Ahmed Egal			egality@gmail.com	Yes	Re-Integrating Somaliland and Somalia into the Community of Nations, 2005
		Jean-Jacques Cornish	Mail and Guardian		editoronline@mg.co.za	No	Prolonging the Somali Crisis: Arab-African Competition in the Horn of Africa, AwdalNews 2006

Somaliland Representatives					
Country	Location	Organization	Contact Person	Contact Details	Reply to Inquiry
USA	Washington, DC	Saad Shiek Osman Noor		no current email	
UK		Osman Ahmed Hassan	Representative of Somaliland in the UK	slrmission@btinternet.com	Yes

D. PIA CONSULTANTS BIOGRAPHIES

Vishakha Apte is a Master's student in the Graduate Program in International Affairs at The New School and will graduate in May 2006. She is focused on the socio-economic issues of development, especially the empowering role that primary education plays on the lives of children. Before her interest in international affairs, she received two undergraduate degrees – Architecture and English – from Virginia Tech. Ms. Apte is a licensed architect in the State of New York and designed corporate interiors and high-end residential spaces. Ms. Apte's contribution to this strategy paper focused on Somaliland and its regional neighbors Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya and environment and health as regional issues for initiatives of cooperation. She also studied the parallels between Somalia/Somaliland and the case studies of Indonesia/East Timor and Ethiopia/Eritrea.

Sarwat Hameed is a Master's student in the Graduate Program in International Affairs at The New School. She is focusing her studies in Media and Culture. Her interests also include international education reform, and this past summer, she completed an internship with the International Bureau of Education. Ms. Hameed received her undergraduate degree from New York University in Communication Studies. She is currently a project manager at an independent marketing company in New York City. Ms. Hameed's contribution to the report at hand concentrated on the importance of key regional players South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen for Somaliland's efforts to gain international recognition.

Christina Kiel is finishing her Master's Degree at The New School with a concentration in Conflict and Security. Her special interest lies with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. She also explores possibilities and limitations of various forms of diplomacy. She received her undergraduate degree in Public Administration from the Federal Polytechnic Institute in Bonn/Germany, department of Foreign Affairs. Before pursuing her graduate studies at The New School, she was a diplomat in the German Foreign Service with postings in Israel, Belarus and at the United Nations in New York. Ms. Kiel's research for this report focused on relations between Somaliland and Somalia and the issue of Somali refugees in neighboring countries. She also compiled the Diaspora and Expert information.

Leila Tayeb is completing her last semester in The New School's Graduate Program in International Affairs. She has concentrated her studies in Governance and Rights, focusing on International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law. She received her bachelor of arts in Politics from the University of California. Outside of the academic realm, Ms. Tayeb's major interest is dance. She looks forward in the coming months to exploring possibilities for infusing her creative vision into her knowledge of international politics and vice versa. Ms. Tayeb contributed research and writing to this project regarding Somaliland's existing and prospective relationships with the African Union, the League of Arab States, and the Organization for the Islamic Conference. She also examined parallels between Somaliland's situation and that of the Western Sahara.